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The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1951-1952 Term
This symposium, presented for the fifteenth time in the
REVIEW, examines the main work of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana during the judicial term from October 1951
to September 1952.
LOUISIANA LAW

I. Substantive Law-Private Law
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES

The property law of Louisiana has always had to include
provision for keeping its Mississippi River and other waterways
within their channels by means of levees and other constructions.
The appropriation of land or its use for this purpose, even without
compensation, is not in contravention of due process.' One of the
ways in which such appropriation has been provided is Article
665 of the Civil Code establishing certain servitudes as impositions
on private property for the public or common utility. In the
early days, the imposition was limited to land and labor and
materials for constructing levees adjacent to the rivers. In order
to meet the needs more fully and to prevent disasters of national
import, both the federal and state governments have developed a
co-operative program for more comprehensive flood control.
Under this kind of plan, it becomes necessary not only to construct levees along the river but also to add other constructions,
such as drainage canals, to protect the levees.
In Board of Commissioners of Tensas Basin Levee District v.
Franklin,2 the defendant objected to the construction of a drainage canal through his property and demanded that the plaintiff
should use the regular expropriation procedure. He contended
that the servitude under Article 665 was limited to property
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
2. 219 La. 859, 54 So. 2d 125 (1951).
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adjacent to the river. The court firmly set this aside without
much historical elaboration s because a limited construction of the
code provision would defeat the basic purpose of the article, and
because the operation in question was considered by the proper
governmental agents as an integral part of a whole project; the
court recognized that a modem system of flood control is vital
to our welfare and has to be comprehensive in its nature. No
palpable abuse was shown in the decisions of the engineers and
appropriate administrative authorities, and the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's order enjoining defendant from interfering with the work as planned. A close examination of Article
665, and its historical antecedents, 4 reveals that the word "adjacent" belongs in the phrase pertaining to the space for a public
river road ("footpath" in the Code Napoleon) and does not qualify the remainder of the article which includes provision for
levee works. This last point was not discussed in the opinion
and might have made unnecessary the dissent from the majority
refusal to grant a rehearing.
PUBLIC ROADS

A landowner can always build himself a private road across
his property, and as long as it is his own private road he can
permit or exclude the use of it by others in accordance with his
personal whims or wishes. But if the public authorities are
requested and permitted to put maintenance and expense into this
road, can it continue to be private or at what point does it become
a public road?
In Porter v. Huckaby such a situation existed and the defendant insisted it was still a private road, because he maintained
three gates across it and had himself contributed some work in
its maintenance at certain intervals. Reversing the lower court,
the Supreme Court held the road to be a public road by virtue of
R.S. 48:491 (formerly R.S. 1870, Section 3368, as amended by Act
220 of 1914) because it had been maintained and repaired at
considerable expense by the police jury for over three years.
The retention of the gates across the road, and their occasional closing, may be evidence of an intent to keep the road pri3. See Dickson v. Board of Com'rs of Caddo Levee District, 210 La. 121,
26 So. 2d 474 (1946).

4. See under Article 665 in Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 La. Legal Archives 383 (1942).
5. 221 La. 120, 58 So. 2d 731 (1952).
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vate; this would suffice to prevent the, "tacit" dedication of such
a road. However, under the statute cited, there was a "forced"
dedication of the road which occurs not with reference to the
landowner's intent to keep it private but because of the three
years' maintenance and expense by the police jury with the full
approval of the landowner. A person can always keep his road
to himself, or he may be able to establish some sort of a shared
conditon by contract, but he cannot have the road maintained
at public expense and still keep it private.
OWNERSHIP

In the case of Lasyone v. Emerson7 an incidental question
concerned the possibility of a partition in kind of a building, in a
horizontal plane instead of the ordinary partition of property in
a vertical plane (by lots, or metes and bounds). The horizontal
idea was proposed as a separation of ownership between the
lower floor of the building and the upper floor. Of course, the
court made short shrift of such an unusual thought so foreign to
the Louisiana property concepts. However, before completely
brushing the idea aside, it might not be untimely to give it some
consideration with reference to the basic policies and objectives
of our property law. In many states it has proven feasible, and
in the general interest, to have separate ownership of individual
apartments in a large building, and in France it has been possible
for several people to have the separate ownership of each floor of
a building. The idea of a horizontal division of ownership in property may ultimately be found unsuitable and undesirable for
Louisiana; nevertheless, it may not be amiss to give it some
thought for legislative consideration.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
DIVORCE RECOGNITION
Assertions of status and relationship are often generated for
purposes of property succession, but it is unusual to find a person
willing to brand herself as a bigamist by alleging seventeen years
later the invalidity of the divorce which had been obtained by
6. Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).

7. 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952).
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